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In 1942, prominent political scientist E.E. Schattschneider said of the

importance of the nomination to political parties: "Unless the party makes
authoritative and effective nominations, it cannot stay in business...The
nature of the nomination procedure determines the nature of the party; he
who can make nominations is the owner of the party."l Statements such as
this articulate the importance of the nominating power to political parties:
the ability to make effective nominations is an integral part of their function
in the electoral system.
However, throughout this century, American political parties have
been witness to a startling decline in their ability to make nominations for
office. Once, the party organization was the primary instrument through
which a candidate sought nomination.

Approval from the party was

essential to obtaining the nomination and the party often rewarded those
who moved up through its ranks.

Now, however, party approval is no

longer necessary in order to gain nomination.

The direct primary enables

potential nominees to make their appeals directly to the electorate and bypass
the party altogether.

Consequently, the party organization can no longer

guarantee that its preferred candidate will win the nomination.
longer

make

"authoritative

and

effective

nominations"

It can no
as

E.E.

Schattschneider suggests it should. The power to make nominations rests in
the hands of the primary electorate and the party elite have been relegated to
the sidelines.

(

For example, in 1982, New York Oty mayor Ed Koch ran for the
Democratic gubernatorial nomination against then lieutenant governor
Mario Cuomo.

Koch worked hard to gain the support of New York

IE.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1942.), p. 64.

Democratic party officials and eventua lly won party endorsement at the state
Democratic convention with 61 percent of the vote. However, Cuomo built a
grass-roots, traditional New Deal coalition and, through this appeal to the
electorate, won the primary and the Democratic party nomination. Koch had
the party endorsement and was clearly the preferred candidate of the party
leadership.

However, party support did him little good in the face of

Cuomo's appeal to the electorate. 2

Another example of party failure to

control the nomination is the gubernatorial nomination contest in the
Minnesota Democratic-Fann-Labor party (DFL), also in 1982. In this instance,
the DFL endorsement went to Minnesota attorney general Warren Spannaus

. by a large majority.

However, Spannaus lost the nomination to former

Governor Rudy Perpich, who had a strong political base in northern
Minnesota and a strong popular appeal. Again, even though Spannaus was
the preferred candidate of the party, this endorsement was worthless. Perpich
was preferred by the electorate, and he prevailed.3
U.S. Representative and fonner state Democratic party

chairman

David Price (D-NC) says of party involvement in his campaign, "Neither my
recognition among party activists nor my wider exposure as a party
spokesman gave me anything approaching a decisive edge in the Democratic
primary... [The] nomination was not within the power of local, state, or
national party organizations to deliver..... "4

The ability of the party to

guarantee a victory for its preferred candidate has <;f¢clined while the
influence of the electorate has increased.

Clearly, party impact on the

nominating process has been severely weakened.
2Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American
3rd ed., (Chicago, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1988), pp. 103-1()4..
3lbid., pp. 103-104.
4John F. Bibby, "State Party Organizations: Coping and Adapting," in L. Sandy Maisel,
ed., The Parties Respond. 2nd ed., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 32.

~
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The power of the electorate to determine the nomination and the
subsequent need for candidates to appeal to the electorate to win nomination
are often the causes of what is known as "candidate-centered politics."
Candidate-centered politics describes a political arena where the candidate is
not only much more visible than, but also somewhat independent of, the
party he represents. The candidate, not the party/ determines how the public
will vote and affects the outcome of an election. This type of politics further
diminishes the party role as the party organization is unable to provide the
candidate with the resources necessary to compete in this arena. Thus/ the
candidate must look elsewhere for resources such as money, communication
venues, and professional campaign expertise.
Increasingly, the candidate finds it necessary to form his own
organization to obtain those resources the party cannot give.

This

organization is formed during the primary election and is capable of carrying
the candidate all the way through the election cycle. The candidate does not
need party approval to gain nomination nor does he need party resources to
win an election.

The party becomes unnecessary, and its role is further

reduced. Political scientist John F. Bibby states that candidates are becoming
more dependent on outside campaign consultants and money from special
interest groups and far less dependent on their parties to provide the
resources for their campaign organization.S

Also, parties have become

secondary to the media as a conduit for the candidate'-t; message. The media is
much more effective in getting information to the voters.6 In addition, many
candidates find it beneficial not to be closely tied to a party at all/ since voters

SJohn F. Bibby, Politics. Parties and Elections in America, 3m ed., (Chicago: Nelson
Hall Publishers, 1996), p. 14.
6Ibid.
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tend to glorify the candidate who stands above the party? The result is a
political system in which the candidate really has no need to rely on the party.
As such, party power and involvement

in nomination

processes has

declined.
The decline of party power and involvement

in the nomination

process has led many to speculate that political parties no longer retain any
involvement in the nomination process.

According to some, candidate

organizations have all but replaced the party organizations and thus party
ability to affect the process is very small. However, that assumption is not
entirely correct. Political parties have faced a significant loss of influence in
the nomination process, but their influence is not entirely gone. Through
various mechanisms, parties are able to have an impact on the nomination
process.

This paper will examine political party involvement

m the

nomination processes for the U.S. House of Representatives to determine the
,extent to which political parties are still able to influence the effectiveness of
nominations for political office.

A History of Political Parties' Role in the Nomination Process

Prominent political scientist

v.a. Key notes, "Through the history of

American nominating practices runs a persistent attempt to make feasible
popular participation in nominations and thereby: to limit or destroy the
power of the party oligarchies."8 Indeed, the history of political parties in the
United States is characterized by frequent attempts to give the voters more of
a voice in nominations for office and to decentralize party power.
7Bibby, "State Party Organizations: Coping and Adapting," p. 25.
SV.O. Key, Politics. Parties. and Pressure Groups. 5th ed., (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Company, 1964), p. 371.
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After the Revolutionary War, the primary method for nominating
candidates was the legislative caucus. In this system, legislators gathered at
the state capital to confer and offer a list of candidates to the voters.
masses had very little say in who the nominees for office would be.

The
A

hopeful nominee would have to appeal to the party leader in order to be
successful.
process.

Thus, the party had complete control over the nomination
By 1800, the legislative caucus was the dominant method of

nomination.

However,

many

felt

the

legislative

caucus

was not

representative enough, and it was overthrown in 1824. At the same time,
Andrew Jackson and his followers overthrew the Congressional caucus as a
method of choosing nominees for President.9
The legislative caucus was replaced with the convention system as a
method for nomination. The convention system was intended to be a means
for the expression of the wishes of the party "masses," that is, of the nonelite.
However, in practice, the convention consisted of delegates chosen either
directly by the party membership in local units or by county conventions.
The membership of the county conventions was chosen by smaller local party
gatherings known as precinct conventions, caucuses, or primaries.

The

convention system did expand the means for participation, but only among
party leaders.

The majority of the party members were still unable to

participate and the party elite retained considerable control over the
nomination.

The

convention

remained

the

dominant

method

of

nomination until 1910 and, in that time, it came to be known as an
instrument of party control.
The direct primary replaced the convention system and, according to
V.G. Key, was "...a means by which an enlightened people might cut through
9Ibid., p. 372.

5

the mesh of organized and privileged power and grasp control of the
government."lO The first statewide direct primary was enacted in the state of
Wisconsin in 1903 as a result of a progressive movement led by Robert M.
LaFollette. The rest of the country soon followed. In 1907, the states of Iowa,
Nebraska, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota and Washington had
adopted the direct primary. Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Ohio adopted it
in 1908.

Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, New

Hampshire, and Tennessee followed in 1909 and by 1917, all but a few states
had adopted the direct primary system of nomination. l1
According to Key, there were three consequences of the direct primary,
each of which loosened party control in the nomination process. The advent
of the direct primary is responsible for the broadening of popular
participation in nominations. In addition, rival factions within parties and
aspiring nominees could take their appeals directly to the people. Finally, the
advent of the direct primary introduced new elements of power into the
nominating process such as newspaper publishers and "others in control of
channels to reach the public."12

Institutional Adaptations

Various state parties, however, have made institutional adaptations in
an effort to gain back some of the power -they have lost due to the advent of
the direct primary system. These adaptations were made state by state and,
consequently, the type of adaptation varies. Some state parties still use the
convention system of nomination. Others use preprimary endorsements to
10Jbid., p. 375.
llIbid., p. 375.
UIbid., p. 381.
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indicate their preferences to the electorate. Still others engage in slate making
and other forms of unofficial endorsement. Finally, some parties do not play
a role in the nomination process at all.
The party convention as a system of nomination still exists as an
option in Alabama, Virginia, and, to some extent, Iowa. 13 However, in 1996,
party conventions were used to make nominations only in Virginia and even
then the convention was not the sole method of nomination across the state.
Alabama does not normally use the party convention system and in Iowa, a
party convention makes the nomination only if no one candidate receives at
least 35 percent of the primary vote. Thus, actual use of the party convention
to make nominations is slight. Generally, when the convention system of
nomination is used, the candidate who wins the convention vote becomes
the party's nominee and a primary election is not held.

v.a. Key speculated

that the convention system survived in states where there were closely
competitive parties and thus, "... made the propaganda of the enthusiasts for
the direct primary less persuasive in these states; a 'democratic' popular
choice between parties existed even though the intraparty procedures for the
designation of the candidate were quite 'undemocratic."'14 The party still
holds a Significant amount of power in states which use the party convention
to nominate candidates as the primary electorate is never given the chance to
vote for their preferred nominee. Instead, the nomination decision is made
by the party elites.
Seven states, Colorado, Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Rhode Island and Utah, have legal provisions for endorsing
candidates.

"The existence of these statutory requirements for endorsing

13The Book of the States 1994-95. (Lexington, KY: COWlc:il of State Governments, 1994
1995), pp. 217-218.
14 Key, p. 377.
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conventions reflects the ability of the party organizations in these states to
retain a significant role in the nomination process even while the state
legislatures were succumbing to the pressures for the direct primary. "15 These
states may hold pre-primary conventions for the purpose of endorsing
candidates preferred by the party. Formal, statutory endorsement often carries
with it benefits for the candidates. For example, in Colorado, any candidate
who receives at least 30 percent of the convention vote is granted access to the
ballot and the candidate who receives the most votes is listed first.

Any

candidate who receives less than 10 percent of the convention vote is
precluded from further petitioning for ballot access.
In Connecticut, the endorsed candidate automatically becomes the

nommee unless challenged by another candidate who receives at least 20
percent of the convention vote.

A similar situation exists in New York,

where the endorsed candidate becomes the nominee unless challenged by
another candidate who receives at least 25 percent of the vote. Candidates not
receiving at least 25 percent of the vote may use a designating petition to put
themselves on the ballot. Endorsed candidates in North Dakota and Rhode
Island are automatically placed on the ballot and other candidates must
petition to qualify for placement on the ballot.l 6 Provisions in New Mexico
are similar to those in Colorado and New YorkY In Utah, if the endorsed
candidate wins 60 percent of the convention vote, then he or she becomes the
nominee and no primary is held (new laws enacted in 1994 and designed to
reduce divisive primaries lowered this percentage from 70 percent).l8

In

15Bibby, Politics, Parties. and Elections in America. p. 140.
16Data compiled from The Book of the States and Bibby, Politics, Parties and Elections
in America.
I'lL, Sandy Maisel, Parties and Elections in America. 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw
Hill, Inc., 1993), p. 152.
18Andrew M, Appleton and Daniel S. Ward, State Party Profiles: A 5Q-State Guide to
Development, Organization. and Resources. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,
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states with statutory provisions for preprimary endorsement, party approval
is valuable to candidates because of the advantages it can bring with regard to
ballot access. Thus, in these states, the party is still an important player in the
nomination process.
In California, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,

Ohio, and Pennsylvania parties engage in extralegal endorsements. 19 Unlike
statutory endorsements, extralegal endorsements do not carty with them
ballot access privileges for the candidate or other legal effects. Rather, parties
that

make

extralegal

endorsements

often

make

quiet,

unofficial

endorsements and also attempt to discourage other candidates from running.
Some states, such as Minnesota and Massachusetts, regularly hold publicized
endorsing conventions.

Other states make less public endorsements.

The

California Democratic party has an optional procedure for endorsing
candidates.

In addition, party affiliated groups, the California Republican

Assembly and the California Democ.ratic Council, also make endorsements.
Political parties in illinois often engage in slate making-that is, drawing up a
list of approved candidates.

In Pennsylvania and Ohio, party leaders

frequently make endorsements. 2o Because extralegal endorsements do not
bring benefits in terms of ballot access to candidates, they are less valuable
than the statutory endorsements. Parties in this case still play a role in the
nomination process, but that role is limited.
See Table 1

1997), p. 318.
19Usually, Wisconsin is also included in this group. However, parties in this state
have not engaged in endorsement since 1978. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper,
Wisconsin parties are not included with those who engage in extralegal endorsement.
2OBibby, politics. Parties and Elections in America. pp. 141-142.
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Colorado
Connecticut
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Rhode Island
Utah

California
Delaware
Illinois
Louisiana
Massach usetts
Minnesota
Ohio
Pennsylvania

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
FlorIda
Georgia
HawaII
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

States with Extralegal
States without Endorsement
Provisions for Preprlmary
Provisions
Endorsement

Source: John F. Bibby, Politics, Parties and Elections In America, pg. 141.
The Book of States, 1996-97, pg. 157-158.

Alabama
Iowa
Virginia

States which use the States with Statutory
Convention System Requirements for Preprlmary
for Nomination
Endorsement

Taole rCeve's of PartylnvolvemennnState-fIIomlnatlng Procedures
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The effects of party endorsements are varied. Some political scientists
contend that party endorsements make the primary less divisive by
discouraging unendorsed candidates from running. 21

However, as the

examples in the introduction indicate, party endorsements are not always
effective in ensuring the party favorite is elected. Nevertheless, the practice
of endorsement continues.
In addition to endorsement procedures, party influence

in

the

nomination process is also affected by a variety of rules that define the
primary electorate in each state. These election rules manifest themselves in
four types of primary systems across the country: closed, open, blanket, and
nonpartisan.
In a dosed primary system, participation is restricted only to those who

are registered in a specific political party.22 In other words, only a registered
Democrat can vote in the Democratic primary.

States that have a closed

primary system maintain party lists and voters are prohibited from changing
their party affiliation a certain number of days before the election.

These

states are: California,23 Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, PennsylVania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. A variant on the closed primary system occurs in
Alabama, Arkansas,

Georgia, TIlinois,

Indiana,

Mississippi,

Missouri,

Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. In these states, voters must publicly choose

21Ibid., p.143.

22In.formation on primary systems compiled from Bibby, Politics. Parties, and ElectioDs
in America and Maisel, Parties and Elections in America.
2.3Califomia, however, recently passed a measure-proposition 198-which changes its
primary system to a blanket primary system like the ODe currently in use in Washington and
Alaska.
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one party or the other on election day, but their choice is not recorded and the
state does not maintain a list of who is in which party.
Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin have an open primary system. In
these states, voters are not required to register in one party or the other, nor
are they required to choose a party prior to voting. Citizens are free to vote in
whichever primary they wish, regardless of party affiliation.
The states of Washington and Alaska have a blanket primary system.
This system is a variation on the open primary system with even fewer

restrictions on who may vote in which primary. In the blanket primary, a
voter may vote in one party's primary for one office and another party's
primary for another.

The top vote getter from each party wins the

nomination and goes on to the general election in the fall.
Finally, in the state of Louisiana there is yet another variation on the
open primary which is known as the nonpartisan primary. In this type of
primary, all candidates from all parties are listed on the same ballot, and
voters choose from among all the candidates.

If a candidate receives 50

percent of the vote or more, then he wins the office and does not have to
compete in the general election.

If no candidate receives more than 50

percent, the top two vote getters, regardless of party, go on to compete in the
general election. In this system, it is possible to have two Democrats or two
Republicans competing against each other for the same office in the general
election. 24
See Table 2

24Because of a court decision which declared certain district lines in Texas illegal, the
initial primary results of 13 Texas districts (3,5,6,7,8,9,18,22,.24,25,.26,.29, and 30) were invalid

in the 1996 elections. Once the districts were redrawn, a system similar to the one in Louisiana
was used for the elections in this district

12

Table 2: State Primary Systems

Closed Primary

states maintain
party lists, voters
cannot change
party affiliation
after a certain date
Califomiaa
Connecticut
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Arizona
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Iowa

Open Primary

Blanket Primary

voters are not
required to
choose a p8.lty
prior to voting

voters may choose to vote
in one party's primary for
one office and another
party's primary for a
different office,. and so on.

voters must choose

a party on election
day, but states do
not maintain party
lists
Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Mississippi
Missouri
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia

Hawaii
Idaho
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
North Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Wisconsin

Alaska
Washington

Non-partisan Primary

Louisiana

Kansas
Massach uset1s
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
West Virginia
Wyoming
a

As a result of a referendum in 1996, California will have a blanket primary in future elections.

Source: L. Sandy Maisel, Parties and Elections in America (1993).
John F. Bibby, Political Parties and Elections in America (1996).
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Another way in which states vary relates to what is necessary to win a
primary election.

In most states, a simple plurality is all that is needed.

However, in 10 southern and border states, a majority of the primary vote is
needed in order for a candidate to secure nomination (in North Carolina,
only 40 percent). If no one candidate receives the percentage ,of the vote
necessary, then a runoff primary is held between the top two vote getters to
determine the nominee.

According to Bibby, the runoff primary was

instituted in the era of Democratic dominance of the South, when the winner
of the Democratic primary was pretty much assured election to office. The
runoff was devised to ensure that the person who was elected had the support
of the majority of the Democratic voters. Bibby states that "the potential for a
second primary diminishes the internal party pressures for preliminary
coalition formation,

and, therefore, tends to increase the number

of

candidates in the initial primary." It is entirely possible for the winner of the
initial primary to lose the second primary.25

Literature Review

Given the transformation of parties and their powers in this century,
parties have been the subject of considerable study and much has been
written about them.

Some political scientists point to party endorsements

and the like as evidence that political parties have successfully adapted to the
changes forced upon them.

Others point to the prevalence of candidate

centered campaigns as evidence that the party system as we know it is in
decline and that parties have not been able to regain the authority they lost
after the institution of the direct primary.
25Bibby, Politics. Parties and Elections in America, pp. 138-139.
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In his book, Politics. Parties. and Elections in America. John F. Bibby

thoroughly examines the ways political parties function in the current
political system. Bibby maintains that even though the direct primary negates
the ability of the national, state or local parties to control the nomination,
they are still in a position to influence the nomination.

He says that party

organizational strength is still strong in many states, especially those states in
which the party engages in preprimary endorsements and holds nominating
conventions. Preprimary endorsements reduce the number of candidates in a
primary contest as unendorsed candidates are discouraged from running
because they lack party backing and the resources it brings. Therefore, the
party has a positive impact on the nomination process because it reduces the
divisive nature of primaries by decreasing the number of candidates who are
likely to run.
Bibby also discusses other factors which are likely to have an impact on
the party's influence in nominations. The presence of a runoff primary will
increase the number of candidates as will a blanket primary. In addition, he
recognizes that candidates are becoming less dependent on parties because of
their dependence on assistance from outside campaign consultants, their
need for an exorbitant amount of funds to run for office, and the immense
power and influence of the media. Bibby says of the development of the
direct primary system that it was a means of challenging established party
leaders and that it gives greater legitimacy to nominated candidates.
Political scientist Samuel Eldersve1d says in his book, Political Parties
in American Society, that party organizations have been heavily regulated
and decentralized because Americans distrust them:

"Since 1900 we have

moved steadily in the direction of expanding the opportunities for direct
'popular decision making in party affairs with less emphasis on making

15

decisions through representative party institutions. "26 He describes the party
organization itself as being characterized by "autonomous

centers of

organizational power."27 The party organization, he maintains, is not a
hierarchy. Rather, it is characteristic of a stratarchy.
Eldersveld lays out the consequences of the decentralization of party
organizations.

He says they have become undisciplined in a formal

organizational sense and are no longer able to agree on leadership and
policies. Consequently, there is no body of party authority at the national
level.

Rather, party power lies within the state and local units of party

organization.

Like Bibby, Eldersveld feels that the influence of party

organizations in a campaign is influenced by the pervasiveness of "new
techniques of mass persuasion" and new methods of mass communication.
The party has become less useful in these areas.
However, Eldersveld states that state and local party organizations are
still

n •••

important infrastructures undergirding the electoral process."28 Local

activists have the power to mobilize the vote and undertake other activities
state chairpersons consider important such as building the party organization,
fund raising, campaign activity, and candidate recruitment. In addition, the
party may seek out possible recruits, encourage people to seek public office, or
mobilize a coalition of support behind possible candidates.

Eldersveld

maintains that, at the time of his writing, 60 percent of those in Congress had
relied on the party for nomination and election where the party organization
is well organized. 29 The party, according to Eldersveld, has the dual role of

persuading those who are able to run for office and of screening out those
26$amuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties in American Society. (New York: Basic Books,
Inc" 1982), p. 94.
27Ibid., p. 97.
28Ibid., p. 132.
29Ibid., p. 205.
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who are not fit to hold office. Finally, Eldersveld says that more primary
competition indicates the more successful party and that "where party was
strong and virtually assured of the election, there were more hotly contested
primaries. "30
In Political Parties and Elections in American States, Malcolm E. Jewell
and David M. Olson contend that the direct primary is a consequence of one
party domination of state politics. They say that one of the consequences of
the direct primary is that the primary, not the general election, becomes the
place where an unpopular incumbent is challenged.
Jewell
nominations

and

Olson state that

the

basic method

of comparing

among the states is examination of the depth of party

involvement in the selection of nominees. At one extreme is the case where
a few party leaders select the nominee and that nominee is not challenged.
At the other extreme is the case where the nominee is chosen through direct
primary by the electorate and there are several candidates from which to
choose.

They

measure party participation in the nomination process by

collecting the following:
•

laws defining who may vote in primaries;

•

laws and practices for party organizational endorsements

ln

primaries;
•

the extent of competition, specifically whether several candidates
are running and the closeness of the outcomes if they do;

•

the proportion of voters who tum out for primaries;

•

the factors that explain the outcomes of nominating contests;

Jewell and Olson state that the advent of direct primaries has removed
the most important function

from

the party:

the ability to make

3OIbid., p. 220.
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nominations.

As a result, the "organizational vitality" of the parties has

eroded. Parties have lost the ability to screen potential candidates and to
present a slate of candidates which best represents party views and ideologies
and which has the best chance of winning the election.

One of the ways

parties have moved to counter this, the authors note, has been through the
use of preprimary conventions and endorsements. These mechanisms give
the parties some influence, but not complete control over nominations.
Preprimary endorsements reduce the number of candidates and increase the
chances that the winner of the primary will have a majority of the primary
vote. The states where the endorsement has the most effect are those in
which the endorsement has a legal basis. However, the authors acknowledge
that the endorsement itself may have little to do with the election outcome;
rather, they help candidates only because they force them to pull their
organization together in order to campaign for the endorsement. Jewell and
Olson also acknowledge the trend of the decline of political parties and the
rise of the candidate centered campaign.
Party Organizations in American Politics, by Cornelius P. Cotter, James
L. Gibson, John F. Bibby, and Robert

political party organizations.

J. Huckshorn, is the seminal study on

The authors state that they are extremely

uncomfortable with the "parties in decline" thesis and concern their study
with parties as organizations.

They list the leading attributes of party

organizations as budget, professional staff, party officers, institutional support,
and candidate-directed programs. They maintain that parties are significant
to candidates and campaign activists because state law assures parties a
position on the ballot, parties can build a popular plurality based on a core of
party voters, and because the party organizations quite often gain material
benefits from the government.

The authors contend that effective party

18

organizations are adaptive and will attempt to find ways to use obstacles such
as the direct primary to their advantage.
Party organizations, they say, engage m two types of activities:
institutional support activities and candidate directed activities. Institutional
support activities consist of: fundraising, electoral mobilization programs,
public opinion polling, issue leadership, and publication of a newsletter.
Candidate directed activity consists of financial contributions to candidates,
provision of services to candidates, involvement

in the recruitment of

candidates, involvement in the selection of convention delegates, and
preprimary endorsements.

During the course of their study, the authors

found that Republican party organizations are organizationally stronger than
Democratic party organizations.

They also found that as subjective party

attachments weakened in the 1960's and 1970's the level of party organization
increased.
The

authors

found

six

variables

that

influenced

the

party

organization's control over nomination:
•

the openness of the primaries;

•

the restrictiveness of regulations governing voter party declaration;

•

whether a straight-ticket option is provided to the voters;

•

whether a "disaffiliation" statute exists-e.g. independent candidates
must announce they are not a member of any political party prior to
nomination;

•

whether a "sore-loser" statute exists (this precludes a losing
candidate from running as an independent);

•

whether the party has the authority to replace deceased or resigned
candidates;
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Closed primaries, stringent regulations, controlling declaration of party
affiliation, the straight-ticket options, the means of punishing dissident
candidates, and

the authority

to designate candidates Wlder

special

circumstances all provide direct benefits to parties. The authors conclude that
although the party in the electorate may be in decline, the party organization
is not and

is, in

fact, being enlarged as it integrates and becomes

interdependent with national party organizations.

A party's electoral

strength is not ,associated with its party organizational strength.
In his book, Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Party

Politics in America. John Aldrich examines whether parties have become
irrelevant to the system or whether they still perform a necessary function in
the nomination process such as the filtering of candidates and the narrowing
of the primary field. Like Cotter et aI., Aldrich maintains that the party as
organization is getting stronger while the party in the electorate is in decline.
He says that because of the shift from party-centered to candidate-centered
politics, the public has come to believe that the party is irrelevant.

Aldrich

takes a historical perspective in his study of parties. The modern mass party
disappeared as an institution in the era of the 1960's, he says. Their decline
happened as candidates came to rely on their own personal organizations
rather than the party's organization.

The process was enabled in part by

television, the media and other political organizations. The end result is that
the party is no longer in control of th'e candidate, but rather in service to him
and is designed aroWld the ambitions of individual candidates and their
campaigns.
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Hypothesis

As previously discussed historical trends indicate a decentralization of
J

party power, especially in the nomination process. This decentralization has
been exacerbated by the advent of the direct primary system. As a result of
this decentralization, various institutional adaptations typically in the form
J

of preprimary endorsements, have been made across the country in an effort
to restore party power. Texts by Bibby and Jewell and Olson suggest that
where these endorsement -procedures are in place, they have served to
counter the effects of the direct primary, to an extent, by discouraging
unendorsed candidates from running and thereby reducing the divisiveness
of the primary election. As Jewell and Olson state, endorsement power has
compensated parties for the loss of their ability to "screen" potential
candidates and have returned to the parties the ability to maintain influence,
but not complete control, in the nomination process. Specifically, preprimary
endorsements, legal and extralegal, reduce the number of candidates in a
primary election and increase the likelihood the winner will receive a
majority of the primary vote.
However, institutional adaptations such as preprimary endorsements
are not the only factors present in the status quo which affect parties' ability to
influence nomination processes.

As Bibby notes, the type of primary

instituted in each state also has an effect on party involvement in the
nomination process. A closed primary system, which restricts participation to
those who are registered members of a given party, allows parties to be most
influential in the process. Bibby states that a closed primary ". . .creates a
known constituency to whom appeals for support can be made, and makes
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control

of the

nomination

process somewhat

easier

to

achieve."31

Conversely, an open primary system, which allows a member of any party to
vote in any primary, gives the party considerably less influence over the
nomination process because it has little control over who will be voting in its
pnmary.
Primary systems and party roles are not necessarily designed to
enhance each other.

Sometimes, in fact, they are meant to counter the

influence of each other. For example, in the state of New York, political
parties are given substantial endorsement power.

In addition, New York

employs strict voter registration and primary participation laws. Hence, each
of these factors, primary systems and party roles, enhances the power of the
other. In contrast, the state of Louisiana has instituted a nonpartisan primary
system, which provides the party with almost no role, yet political parties in
Louisiana engage in informal endorsing procedures.

In this case, the

informal endorsing procedures are designed to reduce the divisiveness a
nonpartisan primary naturally induces.

Thus, it cannot be assumed that

these two factors always work in conjunction with each other. However, each
plays an important part in determining how the party will be able to have an
impact on the nomination process. Those states that operate under a dosed
primary system and provide for a formal party role are those in which the
party has the greatest impact on the nomination process. Those states that
operate under an open primary system and do not provide for any type of
party role are those in which the party will find it most difficult to have an
impact on nomination processes.
There is one other inherent factor which affects the party's ability to
influence the nomination process in a particular race: the status of the seat.
31Bibby, Politics. Parties and Elections in America. p.13S.
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That is to say, whether there is an incumbent running or not or whether the
seat is open or not. The status of the seat affects the divisiveness of a primary
by either discouraging potential candidates from running, as in the case of the
former, or by attracting a large number of candidates, as in the case of the
latter. Seats in which an incumbent runs for reelection typically attract fewer
candidates because incumbents are usually extremely strong candidates.32
This phenomenon,

often termed by political scientists as "incumbent

advantage," can be attributed to the incumbent's prior occupation of office
and the benefits this position brings. On the contrary, open seat races are
often more competitive because the prospect of not having to battle an
incwnbent in the general election makes the race more attractive to potential
candidates.
This study investigates the impact of various institutional factors

0

n

the ability of political parties to influence the nomination process. It will do
so in the context of the 1994 and 1996 elections for the United States House of
Representatives. Two assumptions will be tested: first, that a strong party
role is effective in giving the party the ability to influence nomination
processes; second, that the type of primary system also has an effect on the
party's ability to influence nomination processes. In all cases, the party's
impact on the nomination is determined by the divisiveness of the primary
election.

The presence of party influence is evidenced by less divisive

primaries; a lack of party influence is evidenced by competitive primary
elections.
As such, this paper will explore the relationship between party roles,

primary systems, and primary divisiveness. It hypothesizes that those factors
designed to enhance the ability of a political party to influence

the

32Maisel, Parties and Elections in America, pp. 167-168.
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nomination process do in fact achieve the purpose for which they were
intended. Further, it hypothesizes that where these factors are in place, their
effectiveness is evidenced by less divisive primaries. Conversely, where these
factors are absent, the ability of a political party to affect the nomination
should be curtailed, as evidenced by a competitive primary contest.

Data Collection and Methodology

The hypothesis above was tested using results from the 1994 and 1996
nomination processes for the U.s. House of Representatives. 33 The data set
includes all candidates who ran for an office in the House of Representatives
in 1994 and 1996 and their percentage of the primary vote in their particular

race.
The dependent variable in the following study is represented by the
results of the primary contests. In order to study these results, they were
qivided into four categories:

no nominee,

closely contested, not closely

contested, and uncontested. A race was classified as no nominee if there was
no candidate running in that party's primary. A closely contested primary
indicates there was more than one candidate in that contest and at least one
candidate finished within fifteen percent of the winner. A race was classified
as not closely contested if there was more than one candidate, but no one
finished within fifteen percent of the winner's percentage. Finally, a race was
classified as uncontested if the party fielded only one candidate for that
contest. A classification of uncontested or not closely con tested indicates a
less divisive primary and a significant level of party impact. Closely contested
indicates the party was unable to make an impact in that race. No nom i 11 ee
33Data was compiled from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1994 and 1996.
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indicates a race in which the party was unable to perform even a minimal
function in the nomination process.
The distribution of primary results is explained by the presence of two
causal independent variables: degree of party role and type of primary system.
Put simply, primary results within each state vary according to what type of
role its parties have and the type of primary system it employs. Each of these
two variables was considered separately and evaluated independently of the
other so that the singular impact of each could be determined.

This impact

was measured by the divisiveness of the primary contests within each
category.
In order to examine the impact of the degree of party role on the

nomination process, the various party roles were divided into

three

categories: formal , informal, and no role. A state was put into the category of

formal party role if the actions of its political parties resulted in ballot access
for the preferred nominee.

States in this category have legal provisions

which provide for a party role.

For example, some state laws give the

endorsed candidate an automatic place on the ballot.

In other states,

candidates are nominated by the party in convention only. It is hypothesized
that parties with a formal role in the nomination process have a greater
potential to make an impact on the nomination process than parties with an
infonnal role or without any role at all.
A state was put into the category of informal role if its political parties
take action to support preferred candidates but do not otherwise have an
impact in terms of ballot access. Unlike the states in the formal role category,
states in the informal role category do not provide a statutory means through
which a party can influence a primary election.

Actions by parties in the
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informal category include unofficial endorsements and slate making (i.e.
drawing up a slate of candidates).
Finally, a state was classified under the no role category if its political
parties do not attempt to participate in the nomination process. In these
states, the parties do not attempt to endorse, not even unofficially, or
otherwise influence the outcome of the primary election. In this category, the
hypothesis indicates that the fate of the candidate is truly in the hands of the
primary electorate. Table 3 shows the division of states by party roles.
See Table 3

To determine the impact of the type of primary system on the party's
ability to influence the nomination process, the states were once again
divided into categories, this time according to the type of primary system they
have: closed, open, semi-open, blanket, or nonpartisan. A state with a closed
primary system restricts its primaries to voters who are. registered with a
specific party. Open and semi-open primaries, however, are open to all voters
regardless of party affiliation (there are a few slight variations between these
two systems of primaries, but in both cases, voters do not have to decide until
they are at the polling place which party they will be voting for. As such, the
data for these two primaries were combined). Thus, a closed primary would
be restricted to party members only while an open primary would be all

inclusive.

The other two types of primaries, blanket and nonpartisan, are

only used in three states. Because of their small numbers, these primary
systems will be discussed on an individual basis.
The intervening independent variable, as discussed in the
hypothesis, is the status of the seat. This study does not intend to measure
the impact of this variable, but in order to obtain a true picture of the impact
of various institutional adaptations, this variable needs to be controlled for.
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Table 3: State Party Roles

Formal Party Role

Informal Party Role

states have party
conventions that have a
significant impact on access
to the primary ballot (e.g. in
the form of preprimary
endorsements)

party organizations or other
party groups endorse
candidates or take other
actions in their favor without
that action having an official
role in the primary process

Colorado
Connecticut

Califomia
Delaware

Alabamac
Alaska

Nebraska
Nevada

lowaa
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Rhode Island
Utah

Illinois
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Ohio
Pennsylvania

Arizona
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Carolina

Indianad
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Washington

Michigand

West Virginia

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Wisconsin ll
Wyoming

Vlrglnia b

No Party Role

a

In Iowa, a post-primary convention nominates candidates when no candidates polls 35% in a primary.

b

In Virginia, the political parties' executive committees may substitute a convention for a primary;
this practice is usually followed for congressional nominations and has been used for statewide office.

C

In Alabama, the political parties' executive committees can substitute conventions for primaries,
but they have not done so in recent years.

d

In Indiana and Michigan, conventions are used to nominate statewide candidates below the level
of governor and United States senator.

e

In Wisconsin, the Republican party has a provision for pre-primary endorsements. but that provision

has not been used since 1978.

Sources: L. Sandy Maisel, Parties and Elections in America(1993).
John F. Bibby, Poltllcs, Parties and Elections in America (1996).
Council of State Government, The Book of the States. 1996·1997 (1996).
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To that extent, the data for measuring the impact of party roles and primary
systems are considered within three different contexts:

primary races in

which the incumbent ran for renomination, primary races in which there
was no incumbent in that party (but there was one in the other party), and
primary races in which there was no incumbent in either party (open seats).
In the analysis, the data for 1994 and the data for 1996 were discussed

and analyzed separately. No one political year is exactly the same as the other.
The context of each one provides stimulants and deterrents to potential
candidates.

For example, in 1994, a strong anti-Democratic mood likely

prevented many potential Democratic candidates from running.

Likewise,

many Republican candidates who might not have run otherwise were
encouraged by the vulnerable state of their potential Democratic opponents.
For contextual reasons such as this, the 1994 and the 1996 data were
considered separately.

Analysis

What effect does party role have on the nomination process?

In order to assess the impact different party roles have on the

nomination process, we must first look at the effect of these roles on the
nominations (or, more accurately, renominations) of incumbents. As table 4
indicates} there are a significant

number

of uncontested

incumbent

nominations for all party roles both in 1994 and 1996. In states where party
plays a formal role, there are significantly more uncontested nominations
than in states where party plays an informal role; however} the disparity
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between states where party plays an informal role and states where party does
not play any role is only slight.
See Table 4

These patterns suggest that party role in the case of incumbent
nominations does make an impact, but that impact is limited. The party has
the ability to make the greatest impact in those states that provide a statutory
role for the party. The slight disparity in uncontested nominations between
states with informal party roles and states with no party roles would seem to
contradict the notion that a party can make an impact. However, because of
"incumbent advantage," this is not necessarily the case. .As previously noted,
incumbents are especially strong candidates because they have previously
occupied office and often bring certain advantages with them into an election,
not the least of which is name recognition. Incumbents tend to win a high
proportion of the primaries in which they are challenged and an incumbent
is unlikely to be beaten in a primary.34 As such, the presence of an incumbent
is usually enough to deter potential candidates from running for office, thus

increasing the number of uncontested nominations.
Despite the impact of incumbent advantage, it would be erroneous to
conclude that party does not make a diHerence for incumbent candidates in
states where it is relegated to an informal role. Rather, in these states the
party can and does help its incumbent candidates. It is true that the presence
r

of an incumbent is so strong a factor in primary contests that, even in those
states where party does not have a role, an incumbent is not likely to face a
divisive primary. This does not mean, however, that party involvement
does not influence an incumbent's primary; it simply means that incumbent
advantage oftentimes is enough to reduce the divisiveness of a primary
34Maisel, Parties and Elections in America. pp. 167-168.
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without any party role.

Party roles, where they are present, do benefit

incumbents in their races for renomination, even though the benefits might
not be readily apparent. Further, in most cases, since the party is most likely
to endorse an incumbent because he or she is the strongest candidate, party
support could be considered as part of the incumbent advantage. To obtain a
better picture of how the party can help the incumbent, it may help to look at
some specific examples.
First, as previously noted, states in which party has a formal role
contained the highest percentage of uncontested primaries. This is a clear
indication that legal provisions for party endorsement are beneficial to
incumbents (as they are to all candidates, in general).

For example, In

Connecticut, those candidates who do not win the party endorsement are
under considerable pressure from the parties not to challenge the party
endorsee. 35 In Colorado, in order to qualify for the primary ballot, a would-be
candidate must receive at least 30 percent of the vote at a county or state
convention.

According to political scientists Andrew Appleton and Daniel

Ward, often only one candidate receives 30 percent of the vote and becomes,
in effect, the party nominee. 36 When an incumbent runs, obviously, he or

she has the greatest chance of receiving the convention vote because he or
she is the most well known.

In addition, Colorado parties provide certain

services to their candidates. For example, the Republican party provides their
candidates with 'briefing books" that include "demographic characteristics of
their election district and facts, both positive and negative about their
Democratic opponent."

The Colorado Democratic party provides similar

services. 37 Incumbents who run for renomination in states such as these are
35Appleton and Ward, p. 48.
36Thid., p. 41.
37Ibid., p. 43.
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likely to enjoy an easier road to renomination, since it is the party (and their
own personal campaign) that keeps the number of competitors to a
minimum.

In Colorado, six incumbents ran for reelection in 1994. Out of

these six, four were unchallenged. In 1996/ four incumbents ran for reelection
in Colorado and three were unchallenged

in their primary election.

Similarly, in Connecticut, six incumbents ran for reelection in both 1994 and
1996. In both these years, all six incumbents were unchallenged in their

primary election. In these cases, the party is beneficial to its candidates and is
far from obsolete.
There are other ways,

tOO,

in which the party can help incumbents. In

1994/ Illinois Democrat Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) ran for reelection amidst
grand jury investigations for his role in the House Post Office scandal. The
race was billed as the "political fight of his life."38 However, Rostenkowski
easily won a five-way primary/ carrying 50 percent of the vote and
"demonstrating

that

the

city's

organization still works. ..

"39

[Chicago's]

broad-shouldered

precinct

According to Congressional Ouarterly, a

number of illinois politicians, such as Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, came
out to support Rostenkowski.

Party workers labored to ensure that voters

turned out for the embattled Ways and Means chairman.

The Los Angeles

Times estimated 6/000 party workers had been mobilized by Mayor Daley and
the

Democratic

party

on'

Rostenkowski's

behalf.

Rostenkowski's

renomination was the number one priOrity.40
The data for incumbents running for nomination seem to support the
hypothesis that parties do have the ability to influence the nomination

38Maureen Grope, "Rostenkowski's Ground Troops Carry the Day in Chicago,"
Congressional Ouarterly Weekly Report, Mar 19/ 1994, p. 685.
39Jbid.
4OJbid., p. 686.
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process in states in which they are provided with such a role. This ability is
especially indicated by the large number of uncontested nominations in states
where party has a formal role, compared with the moderate number of
uncontested nominations in states where party has an informal role.

Put

simply, the results indicate that where the state provides for a strong party
role, the primaries are less divisive.

In addition to the numerical data,

examples from the 1994 and 1996 elections illustrate how the party can
prOVide support to its candidates, even if they are incumbents, and thus
benefit them.

It is true that the ability of the party to influence the

nomination is somewhat mitigated by incumbent advantage, and in some
cases it is difficult to tell whether it is the involvement of the party or the
presence of the incumbent which is responsible for the reduction of primary
competition. What is clear, though, is that party does make a difference.
In order to fully understand party impact, it is necessary to look at the

nomination experiences of those who seek their party's nomination
challenge the incumbent in the general election.

to

In these primaries,

incumbent advantage is not a factor and thus it is easier to measure the
impact of the party's role. As table 5 indicates, a clear pattern exists for party
involvement in these primary elections.

As party role declines, so do the

number of uncontested nominations. This result is seen most dearly in the
1996 nominations, where the percentages between states where parties have

informal roles and those with no roles vary dramatically.41
See Table 5

41This variation can be attributed to the strong anti-incumbent feelings directed
towards the Democratic congress which swept the nation in 1994 and thus enabled the
Republican revolution. Such strong sentiment likely produced more competition in 1994 in all
cases.
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The significant disparities in uncontested nominations between states
with formal party roles and those with informal party roles, and between
states with informal party roles and those with no party roles indicates two
things. First, party does have an impact on the primary elections of those
who seek to challenge an incumbent in the general election when it is
provided a role to do so. Second, the party has a greater impact when its
actions have legal consequences, as in those states that provide for legal
endorsements and ballot access privileges. These conclusions are similar to
the conclusions drawn for nominations of incumbents.
Once again, in order to examine the effects of party role more closely, it
may help to look at some specific examples. In these examples, it becomes
clear that certain party actions specifically benefit the candidate or the party.
The most common party actions are strategizing and endorsement.

Parties

strategize when they choose to recruit "sacriiicial lambs" to oppose an
especially fonnidable opponent and thus conserve party resources. This is a
frequent practice of the Democratic party in Utah. 42

The party may also

choose to switch candidates after the nomination process has taken place in
order to further its chances in the general election.

Party endorsement is

actively sought by potential candidates where it is offered and endorsed
candidates tend to be successful. The consequences of these party actions will
become clearer in the following examples.
In 1994, in New York's fourth district, the Democratic party expected to

face Republican incumbent freshman Representative David A. Levy in the
general election.

In an election year that seemed to heavily favor the

Republican party, the Democratic party expected to lose to Levy in November
and did not put much effort into finding a strong nominee. When it became
42 Appleton

and Ward, p. 319.

3S

apparent that Levy had lost his primary and would not be running m the
general election, the Democratic party reacted by giving its nominee, lawyer
Feme Steckler, a nomination for a state judgeship and quickly replacing her
with Philip Scl1iliro, a strong candidate who had run against Levy in '92 and
had garnered 45 percent of the vote to Levy's 50 percent. 43 In this scenario,
the Democratic party reacted quickly to ensure there would be a viable
candidate to run against a potentially weak Republican nominee.44
More recently, in 1996 in Connecticut's 2nd district, Republican Edward
W. Munster worked hard to defeat primary challenger, state Rep. Andrew
Norton. His strategy? Working "diligently in recent months to shore up his
support among Connecticut's Republican leaders. . ." and winning the
endorsement of the state party.

He won the endorsement

and the

nomination, and he went on to challenge Democratic incumbent Sam
Gejdenson in the general election. 45 In New York's 21st district (party has a
formal role here), represented by conservative Democrat Michael R. McNulty,
environmental activist Lee H. Wasserman tried to counter McNulty's
advantageous support from

the powerful Albany County Democratic

Organization by running a grassroots campaign. He lost the primary, only
managing to get 43.8 percent of the vote to McNulty's 56.2 percent. 46 Finally,
in the Republican primary contest in Minnesota's fifth district, where party

has an informal role, lobbyist Jad< Uldrich gained the endorsement of the
state Republican party and easily defeated opponent Chris flYnn with 63
Levy Disputes Oose Loss in New York GOP Primary," Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, Oct. 8, 1994, p. 2911.
.
44Despite its best efforts, however, the Democratic party still lost this election.
Schiliro received only 37.3 percent of the vote. RepUblican nominee Dan Frisa received 59.4
percent.
45Robert Marshall Wells, ''Munster Goes After Gejdenson for a Third Time,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Sept. 14,1996, p. 2613.
46}onal:han D. Salant, "Incumbents Win the Day Despite Challenges," Cong;ressjonal
Ouarterly Weekly Report, Sept. 14, 1996, p. 2614.
43 "Rep.
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percent of the vote. 47 In each of these examples, the candidate who had party
support gained the upper hand in his primary contest. Clearly, party can and
does have an impact on the nomination process.
Like the data for incumbent nominations, the data for the nominations
of those who seek to challenge the incumbent in the general election indicate
that party roles do indeed influence the nomination process. In fact, the
absence of "incumbent advantage" in this data makes the assertion even
stronger.

There. are clear disparities in the percentages of uncontested

nominations between all three categories of party role.

This distribution

indicates it is not only the existence of party role that makes an impact. The

degree of that party role makes an impact as well. The point is shown further
by specific examples from the 1994 and 1996 elections which clearly illustrate
that party roles do have an effect on the nomination process and are
beneficial to the party candidates.

Finally, it is evident from the data

presented thus far that the absence of incumbent advantage allows the party
to make a greater impact in these primary elections than in those in which an

incumbent is running for renomination.
Lastly, in examining the ability of party role to influence

the

nomination process, we must examine the effect of party role in the
nominations for open seats. The data presented here, in tables 6 and 7, appear
to be inconclusive.

The data for open seats in table 6 are divided into

categories based on competitiveness of the general election as follows: If the
nominee received more than 60 percent of the general election vote, the race
was classified as "1," and a landslide win. If the nominee received 40 to 60
percent of the general election vote, the race was classified as "2," and a

47Juliana Gruenwald, "Primaries Set Up Rematch for Wellstone, Boschwitz;'
Congressional Ouarterly Weekly Report. Sept. 14, 1996, p. 2616.
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competitive race. If the nominee received less than 40 percent in the general
election, the race was classified as "3" and an overwhelming defeat. These
races were classified in this way because the most competitive races tend to
draw the most candidates; open seat races in which one candidate appears to
be assured of victory draw the fewest.

Table 7 summarizes the data and

presents it in the form of percents in order to illustrate the results more
clearly.
See Tables 6 and 7

As these numbers indicate, the party role has no bearing on the

number of people who run for open seats. Rather it is the competitiveness of
the seat which makes this detennination.

Where the seat is the most

competitive (sub category 2) the most candidates run.

This circumstance

severely affects the party's ability to reduce the divisiveness of the primary.
Another factor which affects the party's ability to reduce the divisiveness of
the primaries for open seats is the value of the nomination.

As stated

previously, open seat nominations are considered extremely valuable because
the nominee will not have to run against an incumbent in the general
election. Open seats, therefore, provide the easiest route into public office.
These nominations are so valuable to potential candidates that those who do
not have party support/ but do have other resources, will not hesitate to run
and attempt to obtain these nominations.

Thus, there tend to be very few

noncompetiti ve primaries for open seat races and even fewer uncontested
nom inations.
An examination of the data presented indicates that any sweeping

assumptions about the party role in open seat elections would be erroneous.
For the nominations that were closely contested, the patterns for 1994 are as
we would expect. That is, as the degree of party involvement decreased the
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Table 6: Impact of Party Role on Nominations for Open Seal Elections
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percentage of closely contested nominations increased. This specific pattern
would seem to indicate success for the party role. However, the patterns for

closely contested nominations in 1996 directly contradict those patterns found
in 1994.

In 1996, as the degree of party involvement

thenumber of closely contested primaries.

decreased, so did

This pattern does not indicate

success for the party role in any way. Similar contradictory patterns are found
for the not closely contested primaries and the uncontested primaries for 1994
and 1996. What would seem to indicate effectiveness of the party role for one
year is contradicted by the data for the next.
Thus,

because of the ambiguous nature of the data for open seat

nominations, generalizations about the effectiveness of the party role in these
elections cannot be made. The only safe conclusion that can be made is that
the competitive nature of open seat elections and the value

of the

nominations overrides whatever effect the party role may have on the
nomination processes of the races for these seats. The party does continue to
playa role in these races, as it does with all other races, where it is provided
with a chance to do so. However, the nature and effect of party roles within
races for open seats are difficult to determine. As with the other two sets of
data, specific examples will help to discern the impact of party role.
For example, endorsed GOP candidates for Minnesota's (informal
endorsement state) open sixth district in 1994 enjoyed such benefits as a

It • •

.featured space at the county fairs that are a staple of summer life in
Minnesota.

At the Washington County fair this month [endorsed GOP

candidate] Jude, shared space in the tent for endorsed GOP candidates
positioned prominently near the food and games. "48 Obviously, endorsed

48"Eager Candidates Storm Voters, Who Seem Slow to React," Congressional Ouarterly
Weekly Report. Aug. 20,1994, p. 2414.
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candidates for open seat elections enjoy the same benefits as other endorsed
candidates. However, perhaps because of the electoral competitiveness of the
seat, these benefits do not reap the same strategic advantages enjoyed by
candidates who are not running for an open seat.
In terms of evaluating the impact of the party role on the nomination

process, then, the data for the open seat nominations do not prove or
disprove the hypothesis. The example indicates that open seat endorsees do
enjoy the same advantages as other endorsees, but that these advantages do
not have as much weight. Open seats are often too attractive to potential
candidates for them to be deterred by the prospect of a party endorsed
candidate. In open seat nominations, the effect of the party is outweighed by
the value of the seat. Thus/ the party has little chance to affect primary
competitiveness in the elections for these seats.

What effect do pTImary systems have on the nomi1Ultion process?

Tables 8/ 9/ and 10 indicate the competitiveness of the primary elections
broken down by primary system.

Primary

systems influence

the

competitiveness of primary elections in a different way from party roles.
Party roles affect the number of candidates in a primary. That is, they restrict
the competitiveness of primary elections by reducing the number of
candidates. Primary systems have little or even no bearing on who mayor
may not run in a primary election. The various electoral rules associated
with different primary systems do not confer specific advantages on certain
candidates as party roles do.

Instead, primary systems establish rules

regarding the voting population and thus affect who may vote in a specific
primary election. These rules often deal with voter registration and party
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affiliation.

As such, they may reduce the competitiveness of a pnmary

election by reducing who may vote in a primary, or more specifically, what
kind of voter may vote in a particular election.
For example, a closed primary restricts the voting population to
registered party members. Therefore, in theory, those who would be voting
would be those most closely aligned with the party ideology. Thus, in theory,
the candidate who is most closely associated with the party ideology would
receive the most votes and would win with a solid margin. By comparison,
open and semi-open primaries allow anyone to vote in a party primary,
regardless of party affiliation. As such, the voting population is likely to be
composed of people with varying views, values, and ideological backgrOtmds.
Consequently, the vote is likely to be divided among various candidates and
the winner is likely to win by a smaller margin.
Because the type of primary system affects only who votes and not who
runs, we are restricted to examining the not closely contested and closely

contested nominations only in measuring the impact of varying types of
primary systems.

These two categories represent the most accurate

measurement of the impact of the type of primary system on the nomination
process.

How uncontested nominations coincide with types of primary

systems is, of course, of interest, but not a product of the primary systems
themselves. Therefore, races which fall into this category are not sufficient
for measuring the impact of the type of primary system on primary elections.
As with the data for impact of party role, the impact of the primary

system on the nominations of incumbents will be examined first. As table 8
indicates, in all primaries, almost no incumbent faced closely contested
primaries.

This pattern indicates that incumbent

advantage

is the

overwhelming factor in these contests. The strength of incumbent advantage
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is also indicated by the large number of uncontested nominations, which
account for about 70 percent of the incumbent nominations in all cases.
Incumbents seem to have faced little to no competition in these primary
elections. Moreover, the distribution of the data suggests that the type of
primary system had very little effect where incumbents did face competition.

In all primary systems, at least 89 percent of the contests in which incumbents
faced competition were not closely contested (these numbers refer to the
lower half of the tables). In most cases, this number is higher, around 95 or 96
percent, with the highest percentage of not closely contested nominations
occurring

among

the

open/semi-open

pnmary

systems

in

1996.

Conventional wisdom suggests that the highest percentage of not closely

contested nominations would occur within closed primary systems, but this
does not happen. Clearly, incumbent nominations are little affected by the
type of primary system.
The blanket primaries in Washington

and Alaska provide the

strongest evidence of the impact of incumbent advantage. In these primaries,
in which the loosest rules regarding party affiliation are in effect, one would

expect most contests to be closely contested. Yet, nearly all of the incumbent
nominations were not closely contested. The prestige of incumbency, even in
these states is enough to negate whatever effect the primary system may have.
Yet another testament to the advantages of incumbency, are the large
number of uncontested nominations found in both closed and open/semi
open primary systems. Although not used in measuring primary impact; the
extremely large numbers of uncontested contests still bear examination in
this line of analysis. In closed and open/semi-open primary systems, the
majority of the incumbent nominations were uncontested (67 percent and 69
percent, respectively for 1994 and 73.9 percent and 75.8 percent, respectively,
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for 1996). Thus, the majority of incumbents were assured of renomination
before the differing types of primary systems had a chance to make an impact.
These data strongly suggest that incumbent advantage (of which party role is a
part) is a determining factor in primary divisiveness
nomination contests.

for incumbent

Consequently, the role of the primary system in

incumbent nominations is weak and secondary in the face of the advantages
of incumbency.
The hypothesis for the impact of party systems theorized that closed
primaries would enhance party impact and that open, semi-open and blanket
primary systems would curtail party impact. However, the data do not clearly
support this assumption for incumbent nominations. It is not clear whether
closed primaries enhance party impact, although the .large number of not

closely contested primaries indicates that they at least do not curtail the
impact of

party role,

or any other factor which may be at work.

It is also

apparent, however, that the open/semi-open primary systems do not curtail
the impact of party role either, as there are still more not closely contested
nominations than closely contested nominations.

Once again, incumbent

advantage is a strong factor here and it seems that primary systems are
ineffective in influencing primary elections in the face of incumbent
advantage.
The data for those who seek to challenge the incumbent are quite
similar to the data for incumbents, although they are distributed more
evenly.
See Table 9

Looking at the data for closed primaries, we once again find that 64.2 percent
of the nominations for 1994 and 66.6 percent of the nominations for 1996
were not closely contested. 35.7 percent of the nominations in 1994 and 33.3
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percent in 1996 were closely contested. Once again, the number of not closely

contested nominations is greater. However, the disparity between these two
categories is not as great as it was for the incumbent nominations. The data
for open/semi-open primaries are remarkably similar to that of the closed
primaries. That is, the number of not closely contested nominations is higher
than the number of closely contested nominations.

In 1994, 64.5 percent of

these nominations were not closely contested and in 1996, 67.9 percent were

not closely contested. The percentage of open/semi open primaries which
were closely contested are 35.5 percent and 32.1 percent for 1994 and 1996
respectively. In the blanket primary states of Washington and Alaska, in both
1994 and 1996 the majority of the nominations were not closely contested.
As with the data for incumbent nominations,

the data for the

nominations of those who seek to challenge the incumbent do not show any
evidence

that the

type of primary system has an

impact

on

the

competitiveness of a primary. This assertion carries more weight with this
set of data as incumbent advantage is not a factor here. The composition of
the party electorate with regard to its loyalty to party ideologies seems to make
little difference in a nomination contest.
With regard to the hypothesis concerning primary systems, then, the
data for those who seek to challenge the incumbents do not support it. Once
again, it is unclear whether closed primaries enhance the impact of the party
role. However, the large number of not closely contested nominations in the
absence of incumbent advantage suggests that, to some extent, they might. In
any case, it is clear that closed primary systems do not in any way curtail the
impact of party role. No definite conclusions may be drawn about the effects
of open/semi-open primary systems, either. Incumbent advantage is absent
and yet, the number of not closely contested nominations is still greater than
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the number of closely contested nominations.

If open/semi-open prImary

systems do, in fact, curtail the impact of party role, we would expect to see the
opposit~a higher

number of closely contested nominations than not closely

contested nominations.

The absence of this pattern strongly suggests that

open/semi-open primaries do not curtail the impact of party role and thus do
not have the desired effect. As with incumbent nominations, the number of

uncon tested nominations is worth analyzing, even though they are not used
to measure party impact. For those who sought to challenge an incumbent In
the general election, more than half the nominations were uncontested. In
the absence of incumbent advantage, these statistics indicate that other forces,
such as party roles may be at work. Once again, this possibility indicates that
primary systems have a weak and secondary role with regard to their impact
on the nomination process.
A study of the open seat nominations with regard to primary systems is
difficult due to the nature of the data, which are extremely limited. However,
a cursory glance at table 10 reveals that most of the nominations were either

not closely contested or closely contested, as opposed to uncontested or no
nominee. The data for 1994 and 1996 produce differing patterns and as such it
is difficult to come to a conclusion as the data refutes itself. In 1994, it appears
that most of the nomination contests for open seats were closely contested in
both closed primary systems and open/semi-open primary systems.

By

comparison, in 1996, it appears that most nomination contests for open seats
were not closely contested for both closed and open/semi-open primary
systems. As with the impact of party role, the data for open seats does not
indicate the type of primary system makes a strong impact in these elections.
Rather, the effects of the open seat far surpasses any impact the primary
system may have.
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Conclusions

This paper began with the acknowledgment of an historical trend in
which political parties have faced constant decentralization of their power.
Further, the advent of the direct primary removed from political parties the
power to carry out their most basic function-making nominations for office
and placed this power into the hands of the electorate.

In an attempt to

reduce the effects of decentralization, and, more specifically, the advent of the
direct primary, many parties have made adaptations to their role m the

political system and have thus been able to remain influential
nomination process.

ill

the

In some states, these party roles are reinforced by

statutory measures, in some they are not.

In many states, parties have

declined to have any involvement in the nomination process at alL Thus,
the primary focus of this paper has been to determine how successful parties
have been in retaining an ability to influence the nomination process

Of,

in

other words, to detennine the effectiveness of these new roles parties have
taken on. However, there are other factors which could potentially affect how
much impact a party may have on the nomination process, such as the type of
primary system, and the presence (or absence) of an incumbent in a race. As
such, all these factors have been examined to determine how each affects the
ability of a political party to influence the nomination process.

Party Roles
The hypothesis theorizes that the level of the role the party plays
influences the level of primary competition.

Bibby states that primary

competition is lower in states where preprimary endorsements are used. 49
These lower levels of competition arise because potential candidates without
4'1Bibby; politics. Parties and Elections in America. p. 145.
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party backing are often deterred from runrung by the advantages given to
their party supported opponents. Further, parties that have a starutory role in
the nomination process have the most benefits to give and are therefore the
most successful in reducing primary competition.

The impact of political

parties in those states where they have an extralegal role is still visible but
j

weaker. Thus, parties influence nominations by making them less divisive
and paving the way for their preferred nominee.

Those states in which

political parties choose not to play a role in the nomination process have the
most divisive primaries in the country. The data, for the most part, prove

this theory correct.
The data demonstrate that party role does have an impact on the
nomination process, although the impact is limited in some respects. The
impact of party roles was most apparent -in the nomination contests of those
who seek to challenge the incumbent in the general election. In these data,
clear patterns emerge: as the degree of party involvement decreases, so too do
the number of uncontested nominations. Primaries for these candidates were
the least divisive where parties played a formal role; they were the most
divisive where parties did not play any role. Party involvement and primary
divisiveness are inversely related.
The impact of the party role seemed to wane in those contests where
the incumbent ran for renomination and in nomination contests for open
seats. The data show that incumbent advantage is a significant factor in the
nominations of incumbents and has an immense impact on the divisiveness
of primary elections.

This impact is illustrated by the large number of

uncontested nominations in all categories of party roles. While formal party
roles show some ability to overcome incumbent advantage, overall, the role
of the party is merely secondary to incumbent advantage in reducing the
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competitiveness of primary elections. However, as examples illustrate, the
influence of party roles should not be discounted in the face of incumbent
advantage. Parties do provide certain benefits to incumbents when they are
given a role and thus enabled to do so.
The impact of the party role was similarly eclipsed in the data for open
seats.

Here, it appears that it is not the party role, but rather the

competitiveness,

or

desirability,

of

divisiveness of the primary elections.

the

seat which

determines

the

As with incumbent advantage, party

role should not be completely discounted in the face of an open seat election.
Political parties can still give their preferred candidates a political edge.
However, in the case of open seats, the desire for the nomination
overwhelms any hesitation about running against a "party candidate."
Therefore, the impact of party roles is not easily seen in these races.
Thus, several conclusions about the impact of party roles can be made.
Party involvement in the nomination process is helpful to the incumbent,
but not

the

nominations.

major

determinant

of

competitiveness

m

incumbent

In addition, the competitiveness of open seat elections also

outweighs any effects the party role may have, although party support is
helpful to endorsed open seat candidates. Where party roles seem to have the
most impact is in the nominations of those who seek to challenge the
incumbent in the general election.

In these nominations, party actions do

have an impact, especially where the party has a formal role, and the
divisiveness of the primary is significantly reduced. In these nominations,
the party is best able to fulfill its desired role.

Primary systems
Theories on the impact of primary systems are hard to find, but those
who do speculate on them theorize that closed primaries would be the least
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divisive and open primaries the most divisive.

As Bibby states, closed

primaries are designed to allow candidates to cater to a select group of voters
and thus discourage potential candidates.
control.

As a result, parties have more

Open primaries accomplish the opposite.so

However, the data

examined in this paper indicate that these types of primary systems do not
have the effect theorized. To the contrary, the impact of primary systems
appear to be secondary to other factors.
The data for primary systems indicates that primary systems do not
really have an impact on the competitiveness of primary elections. As with
the data for party roles, it appears that the effects of primary systems are
outweighed by the effects of incumbent advantage and open seats. In the data
pertaining to nominations of incumbents, we see that the majority of the
contests are uncontested (which, as it was with party roles, is attributed to the
strength of the incumbent) and that in both closed and open/semi-open
primaries, there are more not closely contested contests than there are closely

contested contests. Once again, the data for open seats do not illustrate a
specific pattern.

Rather,

the results are contradictory.

Such erratic

distribution suggests that the competitiveness of the seats and the value of
the nomination for these seats make them especially immune to that which
would affect the divisiveness of their election contests.
Unlike the data for party roles, however, there is very little difference
between the data for incumbents and open seats and the data for elections
where these factors are not present. In the nominations of those who seek to
challenge the incumbent in the general election, the data indicate that the
divisiveness of primary elections are not at all affected by primary systems.
The results show that for all primary systems there are more not closely
sorbid.
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contested contests, than closely contested contests. Without the presence of
incumbent advantage or open seats to account for this distortion, the
effectiveness of the primary systems appears to be weak.
The data for primary elections only show one pattern:

ill

all primary

systems, nominations are more often not closely contested rather than closely

contested. This singular pattern implies an ambiguity. The weakness of open
and semi-open primary systems is indicated-if these primary systems were
truly effective in encouraging potential candidates to run, the closely

contested primaries would outnumber the not closely contested ones, which
they do not. However, does the dominant pattern of not closely contested
primaries in the data for closed primary systems indicate that closed primary
systems are effective? The answer is unclear, but the existence of the singular
pattern of not closely contested elections throughout all primary systems
indicates it is probably no. It is far more likely that the dominant pattern of

not closely contested primaries in the closed primary systems were produced
by the same factor as in the open/semi-open primary systems.

This

mysterious factor appears to be party role.
As a consequence, primary systems appear to be overwhelmed by the
party role. For example, in three of the open primary states (North Dakota,
Utah, and Virginia), the state parties nominate by convention, and therefore
do not put the question of the nomination before the voters.

In these

instances, the primary systems could not possibly make a difference in the
divisiveness of the primary because the divisiveness had already been
decided before the primary system even came into play. Similarly, those state
parties which provide advantages to their preferred candidates and set them
above other candidates, especially in terms of ballot access, also, in essence,
decide on the divisiveness of the primary long before the primary contest has
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a chance to make an impact. In the electoral arena the type of primary system
is secondary to other factors which determine the competitiveness of primary
contests and thus have little opportunity to carry out the purposes for which
they were created.

Implications
Thus, the impacts of these various factors and adaptations are very
different. The party role adaptations seem to have the most impact as they
are the most successful in restoring some nominating power to the political
parties. This success is especially evident in those states where parties are
given a formal, legal role in the nomination process. Primaries in these states
are far less divisive than in those where parties do not play any sort of role in
the nomination process. In comparison, primary systems have little impact
on the nomination process-they neither help nor hurt party influence. The
minimal effect of the varying types of primary systems is consistently
outweighed by the force of other factors such as party role and seat status.
Political parties are best able to influence the nomination process when
they are bolstered by state laws which allow the party to endorse candidates
and give them certain rights in terms of ballot access.

To this end, those

partles who are allotted formal roles in nominating contests are most
successful. Yet, even in these states, the party does not specifically have the
ability to name a candidate for office. Rather, the party is relegated to simply
giving a preferred candidate as many advantages as it can.
party's impact does not reign supreme.

Moreover, the

It is still in danger of being

overpowered by incumbent advantage or an open seat election.
Thus, the power of the party to make effective nominations still exists,
but only to a certain extent. Party power is still, for the most part, subservient
to the decision of the voters.

However, though voters have substantial
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control over the nomination process, their control is also limited. The degree
and nature of voter impact is often shaped by the structure of the process and
the role played-formal and informal-by political parties.
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